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STATEMENT THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case 
The Idaho Workers' Compensation Law contains a distinctive provision-Idaho Code§ 
72-804 (hereinafter "Section 804") -that gives an injured worker special protections related to 
her workers' compensation benefits. In particular, Section 804 enables the Idaho Industrial 
Commission (Commission) to order an employer, who unreasonably denies or delays payments 
of an injured worker's rightful workers' compensation benefits, to pay the injured worker's 
attorney fees. Under Section 804, the injured worker gets both awards from the recalcitrant 
employer: her compensation benefits and her attorney fees. Once awarded, the Commission is 
charged with determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be paid by the employer to 
the injured worker. 
Mindful that a major purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law is to provide sure and 
certain relief to an injured worker, the legislature enacted Section 804 to enable an injured 
worker to keep her entire award of workers' compensation benefits and not to have those 
benefits lessened by any legal expenses, whether contingent or fixed attorney fees. The purpose 
of Section 804 is "compensatory," in that it ensures the injured worker will be paid her entire 
amount of compensation benefits. This feature in the Workers' Compensation Law requiring an 
employer to pay an injured worker's reasonable attorney fees-in addition to her benefits-has 
been in place for at least 60 years. 
Significantly, Section 804 also protects the interests of attorneys who represent injured 
workers in these often difficult cases because it mandates that the employer cover the attorney 
fees. The amount of the fee must be "reasonable"-notjust a de minimis amount. To deny 
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attorneys a reasonable fee would have a chilling effect on the ability of injured workers to obtain 
adequate legal representation. 
On the other hand, once the Commission awards payment of a reasonable attorney fee 
amount, there is no further need for an attorney to seek payment from the injured worker. The 
injured worker thus is able to retain her entire award of benefits without deducting attorney fees. 
In this way, Section 804 presents a system of payment where the injured worker is paid her 
benefits and the injured worker's attorney is paid his attorney fees. Thus, neither the employer 
nor the attorney is entitled to otherwise lessen the worker's benefits by deducting legal fees from 
the worker. 
The question in this appeal is whether the term "attorney fees" in Section 804 means 
what it means in both day-to-day and legal usage-a charge to a client for services performed by 
the attorney--or whether the term "attorney fees" means something different. In this case, the 
Commission awarded the injured worker her attorney fees pursuant to Section 804. The injured 
worker and the employer then negotiated the amount of fees to be paid, and stipulated to the 
specific amount of a reasonable Section 804 attorney fee award. The amount they all agreed 
upon to be the attorney fee was 30% of the Section 804 award, or approximately $58,000. The 
appellant here, attorney L. Clyel Berry (Berry), vvho represents the injured worker, assented to 
that amount. 
The Commission then approved the agreed-upon amount as "reasonable" and ordered the 
employer to pay that amount to the injured worker. Rather than accept that award as satisfying 
his attorney fee bill, Berry seeks additional payment from his client's benefits payments. He 
argues that neither the language of Section 804, nor the parties' agreement as to the amount of 
fees, should prevent him from seeking additional sums from him client. 
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Berry has overlooked the important purpose contained in Section 804, which is to make 
sure the injured worker is paid her full benefits without having to deduct legal expenses. 
Moreover, he overlooks the effect of the parties' stipulation and the Commission's order 
approving the amount of Section 804 attorney fees that the parties agreed to. Instead, he seeks to 
construe the attorney fee awarded to his client as just another generic benefit, and seeks to take a 
higher contingency fee on both the compensation benefits awarded and the attorney fee awarded. 
Berry bases his entitlement to these higher fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-803 
(hereinafter "Section 803"), the section of the Workers' Compensation Law that governs 
attorney claims for fees as between the attorney and the client. Berry points out that his fee 
agreement provides for up to a 40% attorney fee on all benefits obtained. He argues that he is 
therefore entitled to take a 40% contingent fee percentage against both the client's benefits award 
and against the attorney fee award. He maintains that the Commission's Order approving the 
parties' agreement to a 30% fee should not prevent him from seeking a 40% fee against his 
client. Instead of accepting the employer's attorney fee payment of approximately $58,000, 
Berry wants to be paid nearly $102,000-with payment coming from his client. 
Calculating attorney fees in this way would dramatically reduce the amount of benefits 
that the injured worker will receive. This would fundamentally, and impermissibly, gut the 
compensatory nature of Section 804. That is precisely what the legislature intended to prevent in 
enacting Section 804. Calculating attorney fees in this way would also result in creating 
precedent that substantially disregards the statutory language. 
The plain language of Section 804 provides that attorney fees are just that: fees to be paid 
due to an attorney for services rendered. Attorney fees are not the same as compensation 
benefits. While a Section 804 award of attorney fees against the recalcitrant employer does 
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benefit the injured worker in a general sense, the language of the statute makes a distinction 
between the two types of awards paid to the employer-(1) attorney fees and (2) compensation 
benefits-and specifically provides that the injured worker is to have her attorney fees paid "in 
addition to" her workers' compensation benefits. Berry attempts to overcome the language in, 
and compensatory purpose of, Section 804 with the argument that he has a right to calculate his 
attorney fees in his chosen way because he had a fee agreement with the client which allows for 
it, and because his particular client does not object to it. 
Rather, Berry should be limited to the amount awarded by the Commission. The term 
"attorney fees" should be given its ordinary meaning, which is the fee to be paid to the attorney 
for his services, and not just another generic benefit obtained, from which to take a contingency 
fee. Berry's argument for a bonus attorney fee is simply incompatible with the plain language of 
Section 804, as well as the careful balance that the legislature struck in enacting it. Moreover, if 
Berry's argument prevails, it also would result in uncertainty in the workers' compensation 
system as it would allow the Commission's orders to be disregarded. 
In its decisions below, the Commission rejected Berry's argument that he was entitled to 
take additional attorney fees from the injured worker. It ordered as attorney fees, only that 
amount that the parties agreed to ($58,000), and that the employer-not his client, the injured 
worker-was to pay those fees. As a fundamental matter of respecting the plain language of 
Section 804 and its rationale of fully compensating his client, Berry is not entitled to lessen the 
injured worker's compensation benefits. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Commission substantially agrees with the Course of Proceedings set out by Berry in 
Appellant's Opening Brief (App. Br., pp. 1-4), even though most of the detailed facts that Berry 
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sets forth are not necessary to the resolution of this appeal. The Commission will refrain from 
repeating agreed-upon facts here, consistent with Rule 35, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
However, Berry omitted one major episode. 
In his Course of Proceedings, Berry failed to include a description of the parties'-
including Berry's-agreement to a stipulated amount of the reasonable fee under Section 804, 
and that the Commission had approved the parties' Stipulation to that effect. Therefore, to the 
extent Berry's Course of Proceedings fails to give a complete picture of the proceedings below, 
the Commission inserts the following material facts here: 
The Stipulation & Order Regarding Attorney Fees 
On September 8, 2009, the Commission issued its Commission's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. R., Exhibit S-1. In that Order (hereinafter "September 2009 
Order"), the Commission awarded three discrete items to the injured worker (Page), payable by 
the employer (McCain): 
1. Medical benefits: for the period 11/26/2001 - 5/2008; 
2. Temporary disability benefits (TTD): for the period 11/26/2001 - 9/21/2008; and 
3. Her attorney fees: for McCain's unreasonable denial of the medical & TTD benefits 
R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15. 
The Commission stated that, because McCain umeasonably denied payment on the 
medical and TTD benefits, the Commission would award Page her attorney fees. The 
Commission's Order states that "[u]nder Idaho Code§ 72-804, attorney fees are appropriate 
where the denial or delay in payments is unreasonable. Here, the record establishes that 
[McCain], for more than one year following the issuance of Page 11, had no basis for their denial. 
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This is per se unreasonable." R. Exhibit S-1, p. 14. Because of this, the Commission determined 
that Page was "entitled to attorney fees" pursuant to Section 804. R. Exhibit S-1, p. 14. 
The Commission did not fix the amount of the attorney fees. The Commission gave the 
parties the opportunity to work out among themselves the actual amount of attorney fees to be 
paid, and if unsuccessful, offered Berry the opportunity to petition the Commission for what he 
believed would be a reasonable attorney fee award. "If the parties are unable to agree regarding 
the amount of attorney fees, Claimant's counsel [Berry] shall, within twenty-one (21) days of 
entry of the Commission's order, file with the Commission a memorandum requesting attorney 
fees incurred in counsel's representation of Claimant [Page] and an affidavit in support thereof." 
R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15 (emphasis added). 
The September 2009 Order stated that any filings on this point would need to address 
the factors set forth in Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984), and 
that the Commission would then review the pleadings and issue an order determining reasonable 
attorney fees. Id. 
Berry never submitted a memorandum or affidavit. He did not file anything with the 
Commission requesting a review of these Section 804 fees awarded in his representation of Page. 
Instead, on October 20, 2009, the parties submitted their "Stipulation Re: Attorney Fees" 
(hereinafter "Stipulation"). Exhibit S-2. In it, the parties announced that they had come to an 
agreement regarding the amount of the Section 804 attorney fees. In particular, the Stipulation 
indicated that the parties, "by and through counsel," stipulated to attorney fees in the amount of 
"thirty (30%) percent of the value of' the benefits awarded to Page by the Commission's 
September 8, 2009 Order. R., Exhibit S-2 (emphasis added). Berry acknowledges that the 
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Section 804 fees "were negotiated with Defendants." R., p. 98 (emphasis added). Consequently, 
Berry signed the Stipulation as "Attorney." R., Exhibit S-2, p. 2. 
Berry never filed anything indicating that his interests in the stipulated fee amount were 
at odds with his client or their fee agreement, and a few days later, the Commission issued its 
Order granting the Stipulation. R., Exhibit S-3. In its Order, the Commission memorialized the 
parties' agreement that "the parties have agreed that, pursuant to the Commission's September 8, 
2009 decision [the decision awarding Page her Section 804 attorney fees], Defendants will pay to 
Claimant attorney fees in the amount of thirty (30) percent of the value of the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded to Claimants by the decision." R., Exhibit S-3. 
A short time later, McCain submitted three checks to Berry to satisfy the amounts owed: 
Check 1 
Check2 
Check3 
$131,594.32 
$64,099.41 
$195,693. 73 
$58,708.13 
Temporary disability benefits (TTD) 
Medical benefits 
Attorney fees-equaling 30% of $195,693. 73 
Counsel's Summary, R., pp. 96-101, 97; Order on Attorney Fees, R. pp. 118-124, 122a. 
Berry did not simply distribute the attorney fees (Check 3) to himself. Instead, Berry 
deducted 40% from the temporary disability (Check 1), 40% from the medical (Check 2), and 
40% of the value of the attorney fees award itself (Check 3 ), all as his ostensible attorney fee 
pursuant to his contingency fee agreement. Counsel's Summary, R., p. 97-98, 101. Berry then 
allotted the difference to Page as her net benefits payment. Id. 
Instead of accepting attorney fees in the amount of $58,708.13 (Check 3), Berry 
actually retained $101,760.74. Counsel's Summary, R., p. 97. 
Shortly thereafter, Berry filed paperwork with the Commission requesting 
approval to retain those fees, explaining his justification for calculating and retaining the attorney 
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fees the way he did. In his petition with the Commission, Berry asked that the Commission 
award him not the amount of 30% of the value of the benefits awarded to Page (the stipulated 
amount), but 40% of the value of the compensation awarded (Check 1 and Check 2), as well as 
40% of the value of the Section 804 fee award (Check 3), all as his attorney fee. R., Exhibit 8, p. 
14. Berry claimed that he was entitled to these sums on the basis that his Contingent Fee 
Agreement entered into with Page allows for 40% contingent payment "on all benefits obtained" 
after appeal. R., Exhibit 8 (Contingent Fee Agreement, Exhibit "A"). In sum, Berry claims the 
right to 40% attorney fees on the combined value of all three checks. 
The Commission denied Berry's three different requests to retain this money. 
Order re: Attorney Fees, R. Exhibit 6; Order on Attorney Fees, R., pp. 118-125; and Order on 
Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees, R., pp. 155-159. The Commission's denials of 
Berry's requests to retain more attorney fees than that amount agreed to and awarded pursuant to 
the September 2009 Order forms the basis for the present appeal. The Commission's Orders are 
correct and should be upheld because they are supported by substantial competent evidence. 1 
III. Statement of Facts 
The Commission agrees with the facts set out by Berry in Appellant's Opening Brief 
(App. Br., pp. 4-10), even though many of the facts that Berry sets forth are not material to the 
present appeal. 
However, Berry has included many matters in his Statement of Facts from Page's entire 
workers' compensation case. To the extent Berry asserts that this appeal revolves around 
1 For ease ofreference here, the Commission includes these three Orders in the Appendix to this brief. 
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Berry's entitlement to fees for his representation of Page throughout the entirety of these 
proceedings, the Commission submits the following correction: 
Berry has been paid attorney fees in multiple payments from compensation throughout 
this long case for his many services. In fact, there have been many sums generated and paid 
throughout these proceedings. Moreover, Berry and Page have since settled all claims with 
McCain through two final lump sum settlement agreements. R., Exhibit 2, and R., Exhibit S-9. 
Berry requested and received approval of his attorney fees on the first lump sum settlement 
amount. The Commission awarded Berry a 40% contingent fee due to his diligent efforts 
through this years-long case. R., pp. 122a-124. 
This appeal does not relate to those other funds. The only issue on appeal here is the 
Commission's denial of Berry's request for additional attorney fees from one discrete sum of 
money-those awarded pursuant to the September 2009 Order and stipulation. 
To illustrate the many funds that have been paid in this case-and to clarify that which is 
not at issue here-the Commission offers this summary on the following page: 
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Payment Summary2 
Ber!)'.'s 
Claimant's Attorney 
Date Award Fees Paid Basis 
10/04/2005 $10,846.46 $3,253.94 30% contingent rate Not on appeal 
(TTD) attorney fee 
12/05/2005 $1,529.29 (TTD) $458.79 30% contingent rate ~ Not on appeal 
attorney fee 
5/18/2006 $15,630.73 $4,689.22 30% contingent rate ~ Not on appeal 
(benefit) attorney fee 
6/01/2006 $5,700.00 Fee from Motion for ~ Not on appeal 
Award of Attorney Fees 
4/07/2008 $934.10 Costs re: Page 11* ~ Not on appeal 
5/22/2008 $11,790.00 Fees as hourly rate for ~ Not on appeal 
recorded hours re: Page 1** 
11/03/2009 $64,099.41 $58,708.13 30% attorney fee pursuant THIS APPEAL 
(medical) to September 2009 Order 
$131,594.32 and Stipulation 
(TTD) 
11/09/2011 $248,750.00 $99,500.00 40% contingent rate ~ Not on appeal 
(lump sum attorney fee 
settlement award) 
*Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P .3d 265 (2008) 
**Page v. McCain Foods, L~c., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005) 
2 Information in the summary is derived from throughout the Record, including from Counsel's Summary, 
R., pp. 96-101; and Order on Attorney Fees, R., pp. 118-124. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL3 
The issues to be decided by this Court are: 
1. Whether the Commission properly calculated the amount of Berry's Section 804 
attorney fees to be only that amount paid, as attorney fees, by the employer; 
2. Whether the Commission's award of Section 804 attorney fees should also be 
upheld when the parties' stipulated to-and Berry assented-to the amount of the award; and 
3. Whether there are any constitutional violations that exist here. 
3 In his brief, Berry identifies at least ten (10) different issues to be decided in this appeal. The 
Commission believes that all the issues in the case can be fairly decided within the framework of its stated 
issues here. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
This Court's review of appeals from the Industrial Commission is limited by the Idaho 
Constitution to questions oflaw. Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 600, 272 P.3d 569, 
572 (2012). Idaho Code§ 72-732 provides that this Court may set aside an order of the 
Commission if the Commission's findings of fact are "not based on any substantial competent 
evidence," or if the findings of fact "do not as a matter oflaw support the order or award." Id. 
Thus, this Court "will not disturb the Commission's findings of fact on appeal if they are 
supported by substantial competent evidence." Gomez, 152 Idaho at 600, 272 P.3d at 572 (citing 
Hernandez v. Triple Ell Transport, Inc., 145 Idaho 37, 39, 175 P.3d 199, 201 (2007)). Moreover, 
the Court will refrain from simply reweighing the evidence properly considered by the 
Commission. Bullard v. Sun Valley Aviation, Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 435, 914 P.2d 564, 569 
(1996). 
II. Summary of the Argument 
This appeal requires the Court to decide whether an injured worker's attorney is entitled 
to be paid more than the Section 804 attorney fees paid by the employer where that additional 
payment sought by the attorney will come out of the injured worker's benefits. Substantial and 
competent evidence supports the Commission's calculation of Berry's Section 804 attorney fees 
as simply the amount paid by McCain as set forth by the parties' Stipulation (30% of the Section 
804 benefit, or $58, 708.13). The Commission's decisions accurately highlight that, in this case, 
Berry is not entitled to pursue fees under Section 803 pursuant to his fee agreement with the 
injured worker. Awarding Berry fees over and above the amount awarded pursuant to the 
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parties' Stipulation is contrary to the plain language and rationale of Section 804 as it would 
improperly diminish Page's compensation by making her pay legal expenses from her benefits 
payment. 
Moreover, substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's decision 
denying Berry's request for greater attorney fees than 30% deriving from the September 2009 
Order, when Berry himself agreed to the parties' stipulated fee percentage of 30% (or 
$58,708.13). 
There is no evidence of any constitutional infirmities in this case, and Berry is not 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
III. The Commission properly calculated the amount of Berry's Section 804 
attorney fees to be only that amount paid, as attorney fees, by the 
employer. 
The Commission properly followed the plain meaning and rationale of Section 804 when 
it determined that this section provides a claimant with not only compensation, but also payment 
of her attorney fees. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's 
finding that a reasonable Section 804 attorney fee here is correctly calculated as 30% of the 
benefits awarded to Page from McCain (or $58,708.13). 
Berry would like to calculate his attorney fees by construing the Section 804 award as 
simply another "benefit" upon which he can take a contingent fee; he also wishes to take an 
additional percentage on top of that awarded under Section 804. However, it is inconsistent with 
the language and rationale of a Section 804 attorney fee award to entitle Berry to take anything 
more than the amount awarded pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and the Commission's Order. 
Section 804 is designed to compensate the claimant such that she does not have her workers' 
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compensation benefits reduced by legal expenses. This issue is resolved simply by applying the 
language and rational of Section 804 to the facts in this case. 
Attorneys have several different avenues for recouping payment of their fees earned in 
workers' compensation cases under the Workers' Compensation Law. Before analyzing the 
application of the language of Section 804 to this case, it is first important to distinguish a 
Section 804 attorney fee award from one under Section 803. In order to better understand the 
interplay between various fee sections, the Commission offers the following brief summary: 
Statute 
I.C. § 72-803 
J.C.§ 72-804 
J.C. § 72-210 
Features 
1. General section re: attorney claims for fees 
2. Governed by Commission regulations (IDAP A) 
1. Awards attorney fees against employer, if 
employer "umeasonably" delayed or denied 
payment of benefits 
2. Governed by a reasonableness inquiry pursuant 
to case law 
1. Awards "attorney fees" and "costs" and a 10% 
penalty against employer who failed to obtain 
workers' compensation coverage 
2. Governed by a reasonableness inquiry pursuant 
to case law 
Who pays attorney fees? 
Paid by injured worker 
Paid by employer 
Paid by employer 
These sections (72-803, 72-804 & 72-210) "evince a general legislative scheme whereby 
attorney fee issues closely related to the substance of the workers' compensation claims" are 
resolved by the Commission." Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 939, 737 P.2d 459, 460 (1987).4 
4 
"In worker's compensation cases, the claimant's recovery is typically categorized into types of benefits, 
such as medical expenses, temporary disability, permanent impairment, and permanent disability 
(disability in excess of impairment). Because those benefits are determined separately, the claimant's 
recovery for each type of benefit is an identifiable sum of money." Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. v. State ex 
rel. Indus. Com'n, 2013 WL 646268 (Idaho), 5. Likewise, attorney fees in workers' compensation cases 
are often calculated based upon an identifiable sum of money for each type of benefit awarded to a 
claimant. 
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A. Berry's construction of the term "attorney fees" to mean "benefit," 
from which additional attorney fees would be deducted, is contrary to 
the plain meaning of Section 804. 
The Commission properly looked to the plain meaning of Section 804 when it determined 
Berry's attorney fee award would be only that amount paid by McCain. If relevant statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, a tribunal need merely apply the statute as written. Barbee 
v. WA1A Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 394, 146 P.3d 657, 660 (2006). Courts are to follow the plain 
meaning and neither add to the statute nor take away from it by judicial construction, as it is for 
the legislature, "not the judiciary, to evaluate the wisdom or efficacy of the statutory scheme." 
Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. US. Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 133 Idaho 669, 672-673, 991 P.2d 857, 
860-861 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). Even more, "[i]t is well understood that equitable 
principles cannot supersede the positive enactments of the legislature." Davis v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 469, 471, 943 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The plain language of Section 804 differentiates between the concepts of "attorney fees" 
and an injured worker's "benefits." The pertinent part of Section 804 provides that, when an 
employer unreasonably delays or denies payment of benefits, the employer: 
... shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by 
this law. 
Idaho Code § 72-804 ("Attorney's fees--Punitive costs in certain cases"). 
Under the plain language of Section 804, "attorney fees" mean something different than 
"compensation." First, although not defined in the Worker's Compensation Law, attorney fees 
are defined as a "charge to client for services performed (e.g., hourly fee, flat fee, contingency 
fee)." Black's Law Dictionary 426 (6th edition 1991, abr. ). It is axiomatic that an attorney fee 
award is to pay for services rendered by an attorney. Thus, the meaning of the term "attorney 
fees" has nothing to do with something so different in kind as worker's compensation benefits. 
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If we apply the definition of attorney fees to the plain language of Section 804, we find that the 
attorney fees are a separate award-not a workers' compensation benefit-and that the injured 
workers is to be paid both. 
Second, the statutory definition of "compensation," too, indicates that compensation is 
different in kind than attorney fee payments. Section 804 provides in pertinent part that "the 
employer shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this 
law." Id. "Compensation" used collectively is defined as "any or all of the income benefits and 
the medical and related benefits and medical services." Idaho Code § 72-102. In day-to-day 
usage, "compensation" is synonymous with "workers' compensation benefits" (i.e., medical, 
time loss, disability). Said succinctly, "attorney fees" under Section 804 are not "compensation." 
Thus, when the legislature provided that an employer is to pay both attorney fees and 
compensation, it meant what it said: compensation is for the injured worker, attorney fees are for 
the attorney. 
Third, the connecting language-"in addition to"-between the words "attorney fees" 
and "compensation" in Section 804 further highlights the distinction between these types of 
payments. It is not insignificant that the legislature chose the language "in addition to" instead 
of merely using the word "and." There is, admittedly, only a subtle difference between the 
phrase "in addition to" and the word "and." They are both connecting terms between clauses of 
a sentence. However, "in addition to" implies something more than the word "and." The phrase 
"in addition to" means "over and above" and "besides." The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 15 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 1973). By using the phrase "in addition 
to," then, the legislature expressly indicated that attorney fees are to be paid "over and above" 
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benefits. The plain language of the statute highlights the distinct nature of the two sums of 
money. 
Stepping back from an analysis of the meaning of the terms used in Section 804, it is 
worth asking the question: why did the legislature chose the term "attorney fees," and not a 
different one, if it really intended the term to be in the same class as compensation benefits? If 
the legislature intended for an injured worker's compensation to be decreased by attorney fees, 
why did it not say so? The answer is that it could have. For example, the legislature could have 
required the employer to pay a "penalty," as it did in Idaho Code§ 72-210. The legislature also 
could have chosen to call the attorney fee a "bonus" or "surcharge." Finally, the legislature 
could have stated that a claimant is to be paid her compensation benefits "less reasonable 
attorney fees." It did not. Instead, the legislature chose the language "attorney fees" and 
indicated that they are to be paid "in addition to" compensation, and the courts should not 
deprive a statutory provision of its meaning. A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 131 
Idaho 411, 424, 958 P.2d 568, 581 (1997). 
All of this is to say that the Commission properly interpreted the term "attorney fees" in 
accord with its plain meaning and in the context of the clause "in addition to." The 
Commission's reading of the plain meaning of Section 804 is correct: attorney fees are to be paid 
to an attorney for the fees owed, and they are to be paid over and above the injured worker's 
benefits. It would be improper to construe the statute to mean something less than that and 
thereby allow Page's compensation to be lessened by the payment of attorney fees. See, Rule 
Sales, 133 Idaho at 672-673. Because the relevant language is unambiguous, the Commission 
properly applied the statute as written. Barbee, 143 Idaho at 394. Berry has failed to show why 
this Court should deprive the statute of its meaning. 
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B. One of the major purposes of Section 804, which is to fully 
compensate injured workers, would be defeated by Berry's argument 
for more fees. 
Not only the plain meaning, but the rationale, too, of Section 804 is clear: an award of 
attorney fees under Section 804 is said to be "compensatory, the underlying rationale being that 
the claimant should not have his benefits lessened by legal expenses incurred as a result of the 
employer's ... unwarranted conduct in refusing or delaying compensation of an otherwise 
compensable claim." Clarkv. Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 263, 629 P.2d 657, 659 (1981) (citing Mayo 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969)) (emphasis added). The award of 
attorney fees is not punitive to the employer, but compensatory to the claimant. Dennis v. School 
Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 98, 15 P.3d 329, 333 (2000). 
By enacting this section, the legislature "sought to encourage claimants to press claims 
which, but for such provision, would not be worth their time and effort once the costs of hiring 
an attorney had been deducted from the award." Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 
17, 684 P.2d 990, 994 (1984). The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law to provide "sure 
and certain relief' to an injured worker is thus furthered. Idaho Code§ 72-201; Hogaboom, 107 
Idaho at 17. Unlike the procedure under Section 803 (where the injured worker pays), Section 
804 provides that the employer is to pay the attorney fees. See, Idaho Code §§ 72-803, -804. 5 
Such an award of attorney fees against the employer also serves the purpose of 
encouraging attorneys "to represent clients and take on claims which would otherwise not be in 
their best financial interests due to their relative financial insignificance." Hogaboom, 107 Idaho 
at 17. In this way, an attorney might be more willing to represent a claimant where the benefits 
5 Similarly, Section 804 does not allow for an award of fees to be made in favor of the employer against 
the claimant. McAlpin v. Wood River Medical Center, 129 Idaho 1, 7, 921P.2d178, 184 (1996)(citation 
omitted). 
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were unreasonably contested by the employer "despite the fact that such claim may be worth 
only an amount which may well be exceeded by the attorney's fees of pursuing the claim." Id. 
This statutory award of attorney fees against an employer then protects the interests of both the 
claimant and the attorney. Once the Commission finds that an award of attorney fees is 
warranted under Section 804, the only limit on the fee is that the amount must be "reasonable." 
Clark, 102 Idaho at 263. 
Here, it would be contrary to the purposes of Section 804 for Page to cover the cost of the 
Section 804 award where that section is deemed to be "compensatory" in nature. It is designed 
to avoid a claimant's benefits getting reduced by the costs of attorney fees as a result of the 
employer's unreasonable conduct. Clark, 102 Idaho at 263. By withholding any sum from the 
Section 804 award in excess of $5 8, 708.13, Berry has improperly defeated that important 
purpose of the statute. See, Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17. 
Despite this, Berry argues that he will not be adequately compensated ifhe is not allowed 
to deduct a contingent fee from a Section 804 attorney fee award-that there would be a negative 
effect upon counsels' ability to represent claimants in the often difficult world of Section 804 
litigation. It is true that maintaining proper incentives will help ensure the soundness of the 
whole system. However, Berry is without support in the law to argue that this Court should 
interpret the language of the statute to provide for an equitable result, when such a result is 
contrary to the stated purposes of the statute. A court may disagree with the wisdom of not 
adding in an extra statutory bonus for attorneys who prosecute Section 804 claims, however, it is 
for the legislature, "not the judiciary, to evaluate the wisdom or efficacy of the statutory 
scheme." Rule Sales, 133 Idaho at 672-673 (citations omitted). Instead, the courts are to follow 
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the plain meaning of the statute and neither add to the statute nor take away from it by judicial 
construction. Id. 
Actually, the current statutory scheme does consider the interests of attorneys who 
represent claimants in litigation of Section 804 claims. One of the main purposes of the 
Workers' Compensation Law is to provide "sure and certain relief' to injured workers. Idaho 
Code§ 72-201. To that end, Idaho law recognizes that an attorney's role in obtaining these hard-
fought benefits is crucial to the system. This Court has already held that one of the purposes of 
Section 804 is to recompense attorneys for taking on financially insignificant cases by providing 
them with payment of their fee from the employer. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17 (holding that the 
language in Section 804 requiring a "reasonable" fee prevents the fees of attorneys from being 
artificially low). 
Attorneys are also protected because the fees are mandatorily-paid by employers once it 
is determined that they acted unreasonably. Bradley v. Washington Group Intern., 141 Idaho 
655, 658, 115 P.3d 746, 749 (2005) (noting that "[t]he plain meaning of this statute is that the 
Commission "shall" award attorney fees to the employee when the Commission makes the 
determination that the employer's denial of compensation was unreasonable"). In this way, the 
system in place under Section 804 already protects, in point of fact, the interests of claimants' 
attorneys. 
In summary, the unambiguous term "attorney fees" in Section 804 should be construed in 
accord with the stated purpose of the statute to fully compensate the injured worker. To do 
otherwise and impose some other result would improperly "supersede the positive enactments of 
the legislature" by imposing some equitable principle. See, Davis, 130 Idaho at 471. Finally, the 
purpose of adequately compensating attorneys for their work in litigating Section 804 cases is 
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already built-in to statutory language. Until the legislature changes the language of Section 
804 (e.g., adding a provision requiring recalcitrant employers to pay an additional penalty to 
claimants for the benefit of their attorneys), attorneys must be satisfied with obtaining their 
reasonable fees under a Section 804 award. The Commission's orders awarding Berry only 
$58,708.13 in attorney fees should be affirmed. 
C. The Commission did not make a "sua sponte reduction" of Berry's 
attorney fees. 
Berry argues that, by not considering his fee agreement with Page, the Commission 
improperly reduced his entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to his fee agreement. In support of 
this proposition, Berry cites particular language found in the case of Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 
686, 693, 864 P.2d 132, 139 (1993), a case in which multiple attorneys, including Berry, brought 
suit to challenge the Commission's award of attorney fees under Section 803 . In Curr, this 
Court held that the Commission made an improper "sua sponte reduction" of an attorney's 
contingency fee agreement. Likewise, Berry contends in this case that the Commission has made 
an improper "sua sponte reduction" of his entitlement to attorney fees under Section 803. 
The facts of Curr are not at all on point with the facts of this case. In Curr, the attorneys 
in question had contingency fee agreements providing for a fixed percentage of approximately 
33% to be paid on the benefits obtained. At the time, the Commission did not have any approved 
regulations governing the approval process of undisputed attorney fees under Section 803. See, 
Curr, 124 Idaho at 692 (where the Court noted the Commission's absence of guidelines at the 
time of a properly enacted regulatory scheme). After benefits were obtained, the attorneys made 
application for payment of their contingency fees pursuant to Section 803, but the Commission 
did not give effect to the fee agreements. Without making any findings of fact, the Commission 
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simply, and arbitrarily, fixed the attorney fees at the flat rate of 25%, an amount lower than the 
33% allowed for in the fee agreements. Curr, 124 Idaho at 689-90. 
In response, this Court held in Curr that the Commission had made an improper "sua 
sponte reduction" when the Commission determined that the attorneys were entitled to a lesser 
amount than their full contingency fee under their fee agreements. Curr, 124 Idaho at 693. This 
Court held that the Commission acted arbitrarily and outside its authority. Id. While the 
Commission had broad discretion to approve fees, the Court held that the Commission needed to 
adopt regulations defining the criteria for approval or rejection of Section 803 fee requests. Id. at 
692. 
Berry contends here that the Commission runs afoul of this language prohibiting sua 
sponte reductions of attorney fees when it denied his motion in this case for a 40% fee pursuant 
to his fee agreement, and awarded him only a 30% fee. However, the language in Curr, on 
which Berry relies, does not apply to the facts here. After this Court's decision in Curr, the 
Commission immediately put in place a regulation governing the approval of attorney fees under 
Section 803. See, Rhodes v. Industrial Com 'n, 125 Idaho 139, 140, 868 P.2d 467, 468 (1993). 
The void was filled. The new regulation was immediately challenged by several attorneys and 
this Court upheld it. Id., 125 Idaho at 141-143, 868 P.2d at 469-71. The Commission's Section 
803 attorney fee regulations, as contained in the Commission's administrative rules, have been 
upheld on several occasions since then. 6 
Most importantly, the quoted statements in Curr upon which Berry relies "were not 
constitutional limitations on the power of the Commission." Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. v. State 
ex rel. Indus. Com'n, 2013 WL 646268 (Idaho), 9 (2013) (emphasis added). This Court's 
6 See, e.g., Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368, (1998); and Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 
134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000). 
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disapproving language in Curr was included merely to show that the appellant's property rights 
in Curr-and in Curr alone-were taken without procedural due process. Id. Here, the 
Commission's rules governing attorneys' claims for fees were in effect before the execution of 
Berry's fee agreement with Page. So, even if this case were a Section 803 case-which it is 
not-Berry is incorrect to rely on those statements in Curr, for the proposition that the 
Commission has no oversight over the fixing of a reasonable attorney fee. Thus, "the terms of 
that contract can be, and in this case are, restrained by law." Id. 
Here, Berry had previously been awarded an attorney fee based on the benefits awarded 
pursuant to the September 2009 Order and stipulation. The fees awarded pursuant to the 
September 2009 Order are Section 804 fees. An analysis of Berry's entitlement to these attorney 
fees, then, must be confined to Section 804 and not Section 803. A Section 803 review of 
Berry's request for fees under Section 803 was unnecessary as he was the one who assented to 
the amount awarded. R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15; R., Exhibit S-2. 
To summarize, Berry's reliance on the facts in Curr is unjustified. First, Berry agreed 
with the Stipulation of the parties that his fees on the Section 804 award would be 30%. The 
Commission's denial of Berry's second application for fees on benefits for which it had already 
awarded fees is not some "sua sponte reduction" of his fees under Section 803. The 
Commission's finding that Berry has no entitlement to inconsistently apply for fees under 
multiple sections of the Workers' Compensation Law for the same benefit obtained is supported 
by substantial competent evidence. The Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously; 
rather, the Commission merely refused to substantively evaluate the Section 803 fee request at 
all. Second, the pronouncements in Curr "were not constitutional limitations on the power of the 
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Commission" to regulate attorney fees. Seiniger, 2013 WL 646268 (Idaho), at 9 (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, Berry also cites to Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Fairbanks v. 
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) for the assertion that "a statutory fee award 
may be more or less than that provided in a contingent fee contract." App. Br. at 19. However, 
the holding in Acarrequi is not that tidy. Acarrequi is a condemnation case. That case held, as a 
matter of first impression, that a party could be awarded attorney fees in a condemnation action 
(where the pertinent condemnation statute provided no explicit entitlement to attorney fees). As 
to the amount of fees, the Court held that the criteria outlined in Rule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, were appropriate to consider. 105 Idaho at 878. 
The Court in Acarrequi cautioned that "the [trial] court should not automatically adopt 
any contingent fee or contractual arrangement, but rather the fee awarded may be more or less 
than that provided in the lawyer-client contract." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, 
rather than granting the courts license to stray from a statutory fee award, as Berry's citation 
implies, the case offers the sensible notion that courts are to consider a variety of particular 
factors when determining an appropriate attorney fee. In this case, when the Commission 
determined the amount of the Section 804 fee, it considered a variety of factors, chief among 
them that the parties had stipulated to the amount. For all these reasons, substantial and 
competent evidence supports the Commission's orders approving Berry's fees as only that 
amount awarded pursuant to Section 804. 
D. The Hogaboom factors are not at issue in this case. 
At the same time Berry argues that the Commission failed to conduct a proper analysis 
under Section 803, Berry also argues that the Commission failed to adequately analyze the 
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amount of the Section 804 fees. Specifically, Berry argues that the Commission did not do an 
adequate analysis of the Section 804 fee application pursuant to the factors outlined in 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). App. Br. at 34, 36-37. 
The so-called "Hogaboom factors" are designed to aid the Commission in determining 
reasonable attorney fees under Section 804. 7 This Court has previously stated that the 
Hogaboom factors interpret "the application of LC. § 72-804 and are inapposite to a situation 
arising under LC. § 72-803." Curr, 124 Idaho at 693. Berry has failed to present any argument 
or evidence to support the contention that a Hogaboom analysis was truly at issue in this case. 
In this case, Berry has not contested anything to do with the Commission's decision to 
award Section 804 attorney fees. He is really only appealing the Commission's refusal to allow 
Section 803 attorney fees after a Section 804 award was made. It does not follow, then, that the 
Commission failed to conduct a proper Hogaboom analysis. 
In fact, the evidence in the record establishes that the Commission adequately considered 
Hogaboom, and that it was never at issue below. First, the Commission gave the parties the 
opportunity to present briefs addressing the Hogaboom factors if they were not able to agree on a 
reasonable attorney fee, but the parties stipulated to the Section 804 fee award. In fact, Berry 
made the Commission's Hogaboom analysis very easy by agreeing to the fee award amount. By 
presenting their Stipulation, the parties affirmed that the Section 804 fee was reasonable. 
Second, Berry has not actually contested the Commission's original September 2009 Order or 
the subsequent order approving the stipulated amount of attorney fees, nor has he objected to the 
Commission awarding the amount of Section 804 fees in its "Order Granting Stipulation" as not 
7 The Hogaboom factors "are similar to the factors that courts are required to consider when determining 
the amount to award in attorney fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)." Swett v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
136 Idaho 74, 78, 29 P.3d 385, 389 (2001). 
RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S BRIEF PAGE25 
being based on a Hogaboom analysis. Third, in each of its Orders regarding the Section 804 
attorney fee award, the Commission confirmed that the attorney fee was consistent with the 
Hogaboom factors. Order re: Attorney Fees, R. Exhibit 6; Order on Attorney Fees, R., pp. 118-
125; and Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees, R., pp. 155-159. 
Therefore, Berry fails to support his assignment of error with any law, authority or 
argument. "When issues on appeal are not supported by positions oflaw, authority, or argument, 
they will not be considered" and are waived. Martin v. Smith, -- Idaho - , 296 P.3d 367, 370 
(2013) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Berry's 
argument is waived. For all these reasons, there is no cognizable Hogaboom defect here. It is 
simply not at issue in this case. 
E. Calculation Summary 
In this case, substantial competent evidence supports the Commission's finding that the 
reasonable Section 804 attorney fee award is the sum, and only that sum, that McCain paid when 
it issued its check to Berry for $58,708.13. See Counsel's Summary, R., pp. 96-101, 97; Order 
on Attorney Fees, R. pp. 118-124, 122a. First, the Commission issued its Order appropriately 
memorializing the parties' agreement to the effect that "Defendants will pay to Claimant attorney 
fees in the amount of thirty (30) percent of the value of the workers' compensation benefits 
awarded to Claimants by the decision." R., Exhibit S-3. McCain submitted three checks to 
Berry to satisfy the amounts owed pursuant to the Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees and the 
Commission's Order. Counsel's Summary, R., pp. 96-101, 97; Order on Attorney Fees, R. pp. 
118-124, 122a. 
Specifically, two of the three checks covered Page's benefits compensation awarded 
under the September 2009 Order: $131,594.32 (TTD) and $64,099.41 (medical benefits), totaling 
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$195,693.73. Therefore, pursuant to the parties' Stipulation and the Commission's orders, the 
correct amount of reasonable attorney fees was calculated as 30% of the value of the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded, or $195,693.73 x 0.30 = $58,708.13. This calculation is correct. 
McCain properly tendered this amount ($58,708.13) pursuant to the Commission's order as the 
amount of Berry's attorney fee. Counsel's Summary, R., pp. 96-101, 97; Order on Attorney 
Fees, R. pp. 118-124, 122a. 
Berry, however, improperly calculated his attorney fees by deeming the Section 804 
attorney fee award to be a "benefit" upon which he could take a contingent fee. Counsel's 
Summary, R., p. 97-98, 101. His contingent fee agreement allows for a 40% fee for benefits 
obtained post-appeal. R., Exhibit 8 (Contingent Fee Agreement, Exhibit "A"). He, therefore, 
calculated his attorney fee as 40% of the total value of the benefits ($195 ,693. 73) and the 
attorney fee award ($58,708.13), or $254,401.86 x 0.40 = $101,760.74. Berry placed the amount 
of these funds he requested (i.e., the difference between the 30% fees imposed and the 40% on 
the sum of the combined compensation award and the Section 804 fee) into his trust account. R. 
Exhibit 8, p. 15, if 26. 
In the end, instead of Page simply receiving her benefits in the sum of $195,693.73, and 
Berry retaining McCain's payment of attorney fees in the sum of $58,708.13, and due to Berry's 
improper method of calculation, Berry incorrectly determined Page's attorney fee to be 
$101,760.74. In other words, Berry's method for calculating his attorney fees reduces Page's 
benefits payment in the amount of $43,052.61. 
McCain's payment properly calculated the 30% award. The Commission found that 
Berry is only entitled to $58,708.13 in attorney fees pursuant to the September 2009 Order. 
Order on Attorney Fees. R., pp. 122-122a. For the reasons above, the Commission's finding is 
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supported by substantial competent evidence. The Commission's determination that Berry is 
only entitled to $58,708.13 in attorney fees pursuant to the September 2009 Order should be 
upheld. 
IV. In addition, the Commission's award of Section 804 attorney fees 
should be upheld because the parties stipulated to-and Berry 
assented to-the amount of the award. 
Substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's determination that Berry 
was entitled to attorney fees only upon benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009 Order as 
thirty percent (30%) of the award, as it was arrived at by stipulation of the parties, including 
Berry's agreement thereto. "All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement or 
stipulation of the interested parties with the approval of the commission, except as otherwise 
herein provided, shall be determined by the commission." Idaho Code § 72-707. Stipulations 
for the settlement of litigation "are regarded with favor by the courts and will be enforced unless 
good cause to the contrary is shown." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 
1154 (2002) (quoting Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 634, 888 P.2d 804, 808 
( Ct.App.1995) ). The Commission properly approved the parties' Stipulation regarding Section 
804 attorney fees, and Berry agreed with the Stipulation. R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15; R., Exhibit S-2. 
The parties' agreement should be honored. Because the parties agreed, it would also be 
improper to disregard the Commission's order approving that agreement. 
The Commission's repeated determinations that Berry was limited to the fees agreed to, 
and approved as reasonable by, the Commission pursuant to its September 2009 Order is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. See, Order re: Attorney Fees, R. Exhibit 6; 
Order on Attorney Fees, R., pp. 118-125; and Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney 
Fees, R., pp. 155-159. Substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's finding 
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that Berry "chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 Order." Order on 
Attorney Fees, R., p. 122. The summary of this evidence is: 
1. The Commission gave the parties the opportunity to come to an agreement and 
present their agreement to the Commission for its approval of a reasonable 
Section 804 attorney fee. R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15. 
2. The Commission gave Berry the opportunity to present evidence and argument in 
favor of a reasonable Section 804 attorney fee if the parties could not agree. R., 
Exhibit S-1, p. 15. 
3. Berry did not submit anything. Instead, he signed off on the Stipulation. R., 
Exhibit S-2, p. 2. 
4. The parties stipulation to a reasonable award of attorney fees. R., Exhibit S-2. 
5. The Commission approved the Stipulation. R., Exhibit S-3. 
The Commission correctly found that Berry never submitted a memorandum or affidavit 
to the Commission requesting a review of these Section 804 fees awarded in his representation of 
Page. Instead, on October 20, 2009, the parties submitted their "Stipulation Re: Attorney Fees." 
R., Exhibit S-2. In it, the parties announced that they had come to an agreement regarding the 
amount of the Section 804 attorney fees awarded in the September 8, 2009 Order. In particular, 
the Stipulation indicated that the parties, "by and through counsel," stipulated to attorney fees in 
the amount of"thirty (30%) percent of the value of' the benefits awarded to Page by the 
Commission's September 8, 2009 Order. R., Exhibit S-2 (emphasis added). Counsel states that 
the Section 804 fees "were negotiated with Defendants upon a contingent basis." R., p. 98 
(emphasis added). Berry signed the Stipulation as Page's "Attorney." R., Exhibit S-2, p. 2. 
The Commission's Order is clear. There is no evidence that Berry submitted a 
memorandum or affidavit pursuant to the Commission's Order ifhe intended on "requesting 
attorney fees incurred in counsel's [his] representation of [Page]." R., Exhibit S-1, p. 15. 
Rather, it appears that Berry made the honest, but flawed, legal determination that he would be 
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allowed to pick and choose the statute upon which his attorney fees were based. 
Berry asserts, instead, that the Stipulation should not bind him in his quest for Section 
803 attorney fees, as the September 2009 Order and the Stipulation referred only to "the parties" 
(i.e., Page and McCain) corning to an agreement. App. Br. at 15-16. It is true that the language 
of those documents refer only to "the parties" stipulating to the fees. See, e.g., R., Exhibit S-2. 
However, that's not all that the pertinent documents referred to. Pursuant to the Commission's 
Order, Berry was given the opportunity to submit evidence of his fees to the Commission if "the 
parties" could not agree. R, Exhibit S-1, p. 15. Berry's reasoning that his entitlement to fees 
was not affected by the parties' Stipulation ignores the fact that the Commission gave him the 
ability to contest the amount agreed to by the parties. 
For example, had McCain and Page ("the parties") colluded to deny Berry his reasonable 
Section 804 attorney fees by presenting a stipulation for payment of an artificially low amount 
(e.g., $5.00), the plain language of the Commission's Order provides that Berry would have had 
the opportunity to intervene and request more from the Commission. Instead, in this case, Berry 
assented to the Stipulation when he signed it as Page's attorney. Therefore, it is a fallacy to say 
that the Stipulation did not concern him as it was only between the parties. Berry is bound by the 
terms of the Stipulation because he was actively involved in its creation and execution and 
because he affirmatively failed to exercise his right to contest it. 
Moreover, Berry's narrow focus on the language "the parties" ignores that he was 
involved in the negotiation and execution of the Stipulation as Page's attorney. The very subject 
of the negotiations was the reasonable amount of his own fees. The fees were actually 
negotiated. Berry admits that the Section 804 fees "were negotiated with Defendants upon a 
contingent basis." R., p. 98. Berry signed the Stipulation as Page's "Attorney." R., Exhibit S-2, 
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p. 2. Berry was not in the position of some distant bystander; he was intrinsically involved as 
"Claimant's counsel" in the process of arriving at a reasonable amount of attorney fees. 
Finally, Berry argues that it is clear that he should be entitled to a 40% contingency fee 
payment on the Section 804 award because the Commission did approve his 40% fee in the final 
lump sum settlement agreement. It is conceded that Berry might initially wonder why the 
Commission would limit him to a 30% fee award one day, and then award a 40% fee the next 
day. The critical difference lies in the fact that Berry presented two different fee applications. 
Berry presented the first one as a Section 804 fee-payable by the employer-and with Berry's 
own assent to the stipulated amount. The other, Berry presented as a Section 803 fee-payable 
by the client-and reviewed by the Commission according to the appropriate guidelines. 
Berry is not entitled to present two different fee applications, designed to be paid by 
different parties, and, at the same time, disregard the material differences between the two fee 
applications. The Commission did not improperly fail to make a Section 803 analysis. It was 
Berry who agreed to the Section 804 fees. The Commission found that Berry chose to accept 
30% attorney fees from the September 2009 Order. Order on Attorney Fees. R., p. 122. That 
finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Berry has provided no evidence suggesting that the Stipulation of the parties or his 
agreement therewith should be set aside. In fact, "[a] decision of the commission, in the absence 
of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing 
the decision in the office of the commission." Idaho Code. § 72-718. Importantly, Berry does 
not want the fee award set aside; rather, he wants the fees calculated differently. The 
Commission properly found that Section 804 fees were reasonable and awarded the same. Even 
had a stipulation not been presented and assented to by Berry, Section 804 gives the Commission 
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the discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney fee to be awarded. Swett, 136 
Idaho at 78. In fact, there is nothing in Section 804 or this Court's decisions "that prevents the 
Commission from concluding, in the exercise of its discretion, that a reasonable attorney fee in a 
particular case is a percentage of the benefits awarded ... rather than upon the time spent by [the 
attorney] in representing the Claimant.." Id. 
If Berry were allowed to disregard the plain language of the Commission's Order, it 
would produce incoherent legal precedent. For example, in this case alone, there have been 
numerous benefits paid and numerous awards of attorney fees given. In each instance, Berry 
made application for payment on those funds. If Berry were entitled to disregard the 
Commission's September 2009 Order, he could likewise be entitled to disregard the 
Commission's other attorney fee awards. It is improper for Berry to argue that he is entitled to 
undo either the Commission's orders or his agreements where there is no basis to do so. The 
Commission's orders approving the agreed-upon attorney fee are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and should be affirmed. 
V. There are no constitutional violations here. 
There are no constitutional defects in the statute as applied to this case. Moreover, there 
are no constitutional defects in the Notice of Hearing provided to Berry. 
A. Section 804 is rationally related to the statutory purpose of protecting 
a claimant's compensatory award. 
The facts of this case do not implicate any constitutional concerns. 8 "Unless it can be 
8 Before analyzing the constitutional standards as applied to this case, and as a point of emphasis, we note 
that the limit on Berry's fee here was by stipulation, not because of a statutory cap. Berry could have 
asked the Commission for a 40% contingent fee payment on Page's Section 804 award, but he did not. 
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shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation entirely unavailable, evidencing the 
illegitimacy of the scheme, the scheme does not violate the due process right of a lawyer's 
prospective client to obtain legal representation." Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142-143 (citing United 
States Dep 't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 724, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 1433, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 
(1990)). Anecdotal evidence that a fee limitation will cause attorneys to leave the field of 
practice or will affect the adequacy of attorneys in an area of practice is not sufficient to meet 
that burden of proof. Id. 
Berry's own anecdotal evidence that Section 804 deprives attorneys of adequate 
compensation in these cases and will have a chilling effect on the practice of law pertaining to 
Section 804 cases does not rise to the level of a sufficient constitutional challenge to the statute. 
Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142-43 (holding that, unless the statute or regulation in question makes 
legal representation "entirely unavailable, evidencing the illegitimacy of the scheme, the scheme 
does not violate the due process right of a lawyer's prospective client to obtain legal 
representation). Berry fails to show that legal representation is entirely unavailable. 
Berry also states that the language in Section 804 preferences defense counsel over 
claimant's counsel as it applies only to limit claimants' counsels' fees. He argues that this 
violates constitutional equal protection rights (citing to Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 
Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002)). For there to be such a violation of the 
federal or state constitutions, however, the statute must contain a "suspect class" or "invidiously 
discriminatory classification," and it must first entangle a fundamental right. Heese v. A & T 
Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 600-01, 635 P.2d 962, 964-65 (1981) (citations omitted). The Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law involves economic and social welfare legislation and does not 
The fact that Berry did not obtain attorney fees under his fee agreement was due to that fact, and not 
because of the statute. 
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implicate fundamental rights. Heese, l 02 Idaho at 600. Therefore, Section 804 is to be tested 
under the familiar 'rational basis' test. Id. "Under the rational basis test, the regulation must 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose." Rhodes, 125 Idaho at 142 (citing 
Heese, 102 Idaho at 601). 
Here, Section 804 withstands such scrutiny. A major purpose of the workers' 
compensation law is that "sure and certain relief' be provided to an injured worker and the 
worker's family. Idaho Code§ 72-201. To that end, the legislature has established a means by 
which injured workers may receive their benefit payments without reducing them by payment of 
legal expenses. The provision in Section 804 requiring employers who unreasonably delay or 
deny payment of benefits to pay an injured worker's attorney fees is one rational way to 
accomplish the legitimate legislative purpose of fully compensating injured workers. Moreover, 
Section 804's provision for ensuring that attorneys obtain a "reasonable" fee is also one rational 
way of ensuring that employers do not unreasonably withhold payment of benefits to injured 
workers, while still upholding a system that gives incentive to attorneys to litigate these cases. 
There are no equal protection violations here. 
B. The Notice of Hearing provided Berry adequate notice of the issues to 
be heard at the attorney fees hearing. 
Berry asserts that the Commission's Notice of Hearing, dated December 2, 2011, and the 
Amended Notice of Hearing, dated January 12, 2012, issued by the Commission for the April 10, 
2012 hearing are defective under Idaho Code § 72-713, and violate his due process rights, 
because neither one identified "any issue" to be considered at the hearing. App. Br. at pp. 29-30. 
Idaho Code§ 72-713 ("Notice of hearings") provides that the Commission must give parties "at 
least ten (10) days' written notice of the time and place of hearing and of the issues to be heard." 
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Id. A review of the record shows that the Commission gave Berry adequate notice of the issues 
to be heard. 
Due process concerns are implicated if an administrative tribunal raises issues "without 
first serving the affected party with fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet 
the issue." Hernandez v. Phillips, 141Idaho779, 781, 118 P.3d 111, 113 (2005)(quoting White 
v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977)). "The legislature has 
codified this rule, requiring the Commission to provide the parties with written notice of the 
issues that will be heard prior to the hearing" when it enacted Idaho Code§ 72-713. Id. Thus, 
"administrative tribunals are unable to raise issues without first serving an affected party with 
'fair notice' and a 'full opportunity' to meet such issues." Gomez, 152 Idaho at 601 (quoting 
Hernandez, 141 Idaho at 781)). 
It is not necessary to detail each specific statutory provision that will be covered at a 
particular hearing. For example, "notice informing the parties that the purpose of the hearing is 
to determine the amount of benefits a claimant is entitled to, also complies with due process 
requirements, even when the notice does not detail specific statutory provisions to be covered at 
the hearing." McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 333-34, 17 P.3d 272, 277-78 (2000) (citing 
,Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 847, 840 P.2d 383, 391 (1992)) (emphasis 
added). In McGee, the Notice provided was adequate even if the employer "did not receive 
notice that LC.§ 72-210 was to be applied against him at the benefits hearing." McGee, 135 
Idaho at 334. 
Likewise, a notice of hearing that states that the Commission would take up for hearing 
"all issues considered by the Appeals Examiner" satisfies due process requirements. Roll v. City 
of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22, 27, 665 P.2d 721, 726 (1983); see also, Henderson v. _McCain 
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Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 564-65, 130 P.3d 1097, 1102-03 (2006) (where claimant made a 
claim for further medical benefits, but Commission's notice did not specify that "causation" 
would be addressed, due process was not violated because "causation" was necessarily at issue to 
address whether claimant was entitled to benefits). 
First, Berry is incorrect that the Notices of Hearing failed to identify "any issue" to be 
heard at the hearing. The December Notice of Hearing was not just a notice of a time and place 
for some general hearing. In fact, it states that it would be on "on Claimant's entitlement to 
attorney fees." R., p. 8. Moreover, the January Amended Notice of Hearing clarifies that the 
hearing would be on "Claimant's attorney's entitlement to attorney fees." R., p. 10 (emphasis 
added). Berry was provided notice informing him that the purpose of the hearing was to 
determine the specific issue of his entitlement to attorney fees. This notice was adequate, even it 
it did not detail the specific statutory provisions that would be covered at the hearing. McGee, 
135 Idaho at 333-34. 
Second, the Notice of Hearing was issued at Berry's request. When the Commission set 
the matter for hearing, they were doing it in response to Berry's request to have his fee request 
considered. For one, Berry's own request for hearing indicates that it was based on his original 
petition and affidavit for attorney fees. R., p. 3; R., Exhibit S-4; R., Exhibit 8. Berry's affidavit 
refers to the Commission's original September 2009 Order on Section 804 fees, and it also 
includes Berry's request for 40% attorney fees on Page's compensation and the Section 804 
award. See, R., pp. 8, 14, 16-17. Moreover, Berry's own request for hearing also indicates that 
the matter to be heard included his April 9, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration. R., p. 3. In that 
motion, Berry argued that the Commission had improperly analyzed his Section 803 fee request 
on the basis of Section 804; that the Commission's regulations governing Section 803 attorney 
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fees was incomplete; and that his fee agreement allowed him to calculate fees upon the value of 
the Section 804 award. The context of Berry's own request for a hearing was, in fact, to consider 
Berry's specific request for the fees in question. 
Third, Berry had actual notice of the issues to be heard. When the Commission staff 
attempted to set Berry's Motion for Reconsideration for hearing, Berry indicated that he wanted 
to defer any hearing until his client would be able to attend. R. Exhibit 7. The Commission 
informed Berry that they would accommodate his request and that he could set the matter of his 
attorney fees for hearing on his entitlement to section 803 and 804 fees. R. Exhibit 7, p. 1. 
Berry was charged with informing the Commission of his available dates. Id. Thus, Berry knew 
that the Motion for Reconsideration would be at issue. Finally, approximately twenty days 
before the hearing, Berry filed his Third Affidavit in support of fees, a 51-page document which 
specifically stated that the original and "pending Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 
17, 2009, and/or Motion to Reconsider," as well as his other motions, were "before the 
Commission." R., pp. 21, 28. Berry had notice of the issues to be decided at the hearing. 
In summary, the language contained in the Notices of Hearing provided adequate notice 
to Berry that his request for entitlement of fees was at issue. The Notices are accurate even if 
they do not detail specific statutes to be covered at the hearing. In any case, considering the fact 
that the hearing was set at Berry's request, and was in relation to the many documents that Berry 
filed in support of his argument for Section 803 fees, it cannot be said that Berry did not have 
actual notice of the issues to be heard at the hearing. Berry's due process rights were not 
violated. 
VI. Berry is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Berry requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to his original Petition for Attorney Fees 
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or upon the basis of the private attorney general doctrine. App. Br. at pp. 37-38. In his brief, 
Berry candidly acknowledges that this Court has determined there is no basis for attorney fee 
awards in workers' compensation appeals upon the private attorney general doctrine. App. Br. at 
p. 37 (citing to Curr, 124 Idaho at 694; and Smith v. Idaho Com'n on Redistricting, 136 Idaho 
542, 544, 38 P.3d 121, 123 (2001)). Berry offers no legal support and no substantive argument 
for applying the doctrine here. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(5) requires a proponent for attorney fees on appeal to provide 
a statement of the basis for such an award of attorneys fees. A party waives his entitlement to 
attorney fees on appeal when its brief fails to provide either authority or argument in support of 
the issue. Young Electric Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117, 123 
(2001) (citing Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263). Because Berry has failed to provide authority or 
argument in support of his request for attorney fees on appeal, it should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the orders of the Commission awarding Berry's reasonable attorney 
fees in the amount of $58,708.13, pursuant to the September 2009 Order, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 2. tf day of April, 2013. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Order Regarding Attorney Fees (April 1, 2010) 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VERDENE PAGE, 
Claimant, 
v. 
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO., ) 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
IC 2002-007246 
ORDER REGARDING 
. ATTORNEY FEES 
FILED 
APR -, 1 2010 
INIUSTfrlAL COMMISSION 
On September 8, 2009, the Commission issued a decision in the above-captioned case, 
finding that Claimant was entitled to additional medical care benefits, temporary total disability 
benefits, and attorney fees. Subsequent to the decision, the parties stipulated that Defendants 
would pay Claimant attorney fees in the amount of 30% of the value of the workers' 
compensation benefits awarded by the decision. The Commission approved the stipulation in an 
order filed October 22, 2009. 
On December 30, 2009, Claimant's attorney, L. Clyel Berry, filed a petition for approval 
of fees. Mr. Berry asks the Commission to approve attorney fees in the amount of 40% of the 
funds obtained as a result of the decision. Mr. Berry bases his petition on his contingent" fee 
agreement with Claimant, dated April 24, 2002, in which Claimant agreed to compensate Mr. 
Berry with 40% of benefits obtained if the case was rescheduled for hearing before the 
Commission after an appeal. Claimant has filed an affidavit in support of Mr. Berry's petition. 
ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
Under Idaho Code § 72-804, attorney fees must be reasonable. In determining a 
reasonable fee on a contingency basis, the Commission must consider several factors, including 
1) the anticipated time and labor required to perform the legal services properly, 2) the novelty 
and difficulty of the legal issues involved in the matter, 3) the fees customarily charged for 
similar legal services, 4) the possible total recovery if successful, 5) the time limitations imposed 
by the client or by circumstances of the case, 6) the nature and length of the attorney-client 
relationship, 7) the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney, 8) the ability of the client to 
pay for legal services to be rendered, and 9) the risk of no recovery. Hogaboom v. Economy 
Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 15, 684 P.2d 990, 992 (1984). Though the Commission is not required to 
specifically address or refer to every Hogaboom factor, the Commission does need to consider 
them. Bradley v. Washington Group, 141 Idaho 655, 659, 115 P.3d 746, 750 (2005). 
In the affidavit accompanying his petition for fees, Mr. Berry discusses each of the 
Hogaboom factors. He states that he has recorded 569.9 hours thus far in his representation of 
Claimant. He further maintains that Claimant's case involved legal issues that were both novel 
and difficult; to date, Claimant's case has been heard by the Commission on three occasions and 
been appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court twice. Mr. Berry has represented Claimant in this 
case for almost eight years, and his representation is ongoing. Claimant would not have been 
able to secure representation absent a contingent fee agreement, and the risk of no recovery was 
substantial; indeed, Claimant's entitlement to recovery was initially denied by the Commission. 
Having considered :Mr. Berry's petition and the Hogaboom factors, we do not find the 
requested fee of 40% to be reasonable. Claimant and Defendants have stipulated to fees of 30%. 
The Commission ordered Defendants to pay attorney fees to Claimant, and we do not find it 
reasonable to approve a petition that would take a portion of the fees from Claimant's awarded 
ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
benefits rather than from Defendants. 
Consequently, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. Berry's petition for approval of fees 
is DENIED, and that Claimant's award of attorney fees shall be 30% of the value of the awarded 
benefits. 
DATED this L day of April, 2010. 
INDUSTRlAL COJ\1MJSSION 
,,,, .... ,,,, 
,,, ,,,, Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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''''~:ifRTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /~day of April, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
L CLYEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
11ARK C PETERSON 
POBOX829 
BOISE ID 83701 
eb 
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Document #2: 
Order on Attorney Fees (June 21, 2012) 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VERDENE PAGE, 
Claimant, 
v. 
McCAIN FOODS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
CO:MPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2002-007246 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
Fl LED 
JUN 2 1 2012 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSlON 
This matter comes before the Commission on a variety of issues dealing with attorney 
fees due to Claimant's counsel (Counsel). This matter was mediated and a lump sum settlement 
agreement was approved by the Commission on November 8, 2011. On November 21, 2011, 
Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. A hearing was held on April 10, 2012 and 
Counsel submitted a post hearing brief on May 2, 2012. 
The issues addressed by the Commission in this order are summarized below. The. 
Commission is aware that this recitation of the issues was not presented prior to hearing, but was 
instead molded from what was presented at hearing and by Counsel in his Post-Hearing Briefing 
upon Attorney Fees. 
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1. Whether Counsel's Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 12, 2010, was extinguished 
by the execution of a hunp sum settlement agreement, 
2. If not, whether the Commission should grant the Motion for Reconsideration and award 
an attorney fee beyond what was approved on October 22, 2009, as submitted by 
stipulation, and 
3. Whether Counsel has proven entitlement to an attorney fee greater than 30% of the lump 
sum settlement agreement proceeds. 
Claimant's April 12, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration 
Counsel argues that he is entitled to additional attorney fees on benefits awarded by the 
Commission's September 2009 order. The necessary timeline for evaluating the April 12, 2010 
Motion for Reconsideration is as follows. On September 8, 2009 the Commission issued a 
decision in Claimant's case which included an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
72-804. A stipulation was submitted stated that Counsel agreed to accept, and Defendants 
agreed to pay, 30% of the total benefits awarded in the September 8, 2009 order as attorney fees 
to Counsel. The Commission issued an order approving the stipulation on October 22, 2009. 
Then on December 30, 2009, Counsel filed Claimant's Petition for Approval of Fees 
requesting attorney fees on the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order in addition to those 
paid by Defendants. On April 1, 2010, the Commission issued an order denying Counsel any 
attorney fees beyond the 30% previously paid by Defendants pursuant to the stipulation. On 
April 12, 2010, Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider and Request for Hearing on the Order on 
Attorney Fees. A hearing was never held because Claimant was receiving medical treatment and 
she desired to be present at the hearing. Thus, no order on the motion to reconsider was ever . 
issued by the Commission. 
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Thereafter, the case with Employer was settled through mediation. The settlement lists 
the prior attorney fees taken but it does not reference the intention that the motion for 
reconsideration of attorney fees is excluded from the settlement. Filed concurrently with the 
lump sum settlement was Claimant's Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement Between 
Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety signed by Counsel and Claimant. On pages 12-
13 of the 22 page document is the following sentence, "The Commission currently has pending 
before it Claimant's counsel's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b hearing, which may now be set at the 
convenience of the Commission." 
The lump sum settlement agreement was approved on November 8, 2011, by an Order 
Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. The Order stated that 
the agreement was approved with the exception of the request for 40% attorney fees claimed 
from the settlement amount. The Commission approved 30% attorney fees and ordered Counsel 
to hold the remaining 10% in trust pendin.g further order of the Commission. 
Then on November 21, 2011, Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's 
Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. The 
Petition requests a hearing on the issue of Claimant's December 36, 2009 Petition for Approval 
of Fees and the April 9, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying the Petition for 
Approval of Fees. 
The matter was set for hearing at which time Counsel clarified that he was seeking an 
additional 10% in attorney fees from the September 2009 order, as well as an additional 10% in 
attorney fees from the lump sum settlement amooot. The request for attorney fees on the lump 
sum settlement will be addressed later in this order. 
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First the Commission will address whether it is proper to rule on the April 12, 2010, 
Motion to Reconsider. Generally a lump sum settlement agreement resolves all issues in a case 
and the pending litigation, including motions, are merged into the settlement and resolved. 
However, this case was different in several respects. As set forth above, Claimant's Confidential 
Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement stated that the Commission could now set a hearing for the 
Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the lump sum settlement agreement was very specific in 
only resolving income benefits. The settlement agreement left entitlement to medical benefits 
open and did not mention attorney fees for Counsel other than the breakdown amount of prior 
attorney fees taken prior and attorney fees taken from the settlement agreement. The 
Commission finds enough ambiguity in the timeline and documents that a ruling on April 12, 
., 
20 i 0 Motion to Reconsider is warranted. 
Counsel argues that the Commission is bound by the contingent fee agreement entered 
into by Counsel and Claimant on April 24, 2002, which allows for an attorney fee of 40% if the 
matter is taken on appeal. The Commission has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee 
agreement entered into between Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in determining the 
understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the contingent fee agreement is not 
determinative of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an award of Idaho Code §72-804 
attorney fees or Idaho Code §72-803. See Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 16, 
684 P,2d 990, 993 (1984). 
The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
804 and the Commission's September 2009 order in this case is that Counsel and Defendants 
!I 
came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay Counsel in 
satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. The only fees that Counsel will 
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receive pertaining to the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order are those paid by 
Defendants. No additional attorney fees pertaining to the September 2009 order will be granted 
to Counsel pursuant to the fee agreement executed with_ Claimant. If Counsel wanted to argue 
for more than 30% in attorney fees he could have made that argument to Defendants or to the 
Commission at that time. Counsel chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 
order. The Commission will not award additional attorney fees on the same benefits. Claimant's 
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Calculation of Attorney Fees from the September 2009 Order 
Further, the Commission takes exception with Counsel's calculation of attorney fees from 
the September 2009 order and award. The award provided for medical benefits and temporary 
disability, as well as attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. As discussed above, 
Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants 
would pay Counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. Counsel 
chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 order. 
Three checks were issued by Defendants. The first check was for medical benefits, the 
second check was for temporary disability, and the third check was for attorney fees. The 
Commission would have expected Counsel to accept the third check as payment for attorney 
fees. The third check was issued after the Commission issued its order approving the stipulation 
and the check was in the amount of 30% of the total of check one and two. Instead of accepting 
the amount of the third check as 30% of the benefits awarded, Counsel added the attorney fee 
check into the total pot of money and then took 3 0% of that larger total. Calculated as Counsel 
did, the attorney fee represents 39% of benefits awarded. 
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Check 1 
Check2 
Check 3 
$131,594.32 Medical benefits 
$64,099.41 Temporary disability benefits 
$195,693.73 Total benefits awarded 
$58,708.13 Equaling 30% of $195,693.73 
$254,401.86 Total of Checks 1, 2, and 3 
$76,320.56 Attorney fees taken - 30% of all funds received ($254,401.86) 
Counsel argues that the award of Idaho Code §72-804 attorney fees is a benefit to 
Claimant that should be included in the total amount of benefits received, and then attorney 
should take 30% of the grand total. The Commission disagrees. Attorney fees granted after an 
i.lnreasonable denial are just that, attorney fees granted to pay the attorney so that a claimant does 
not have to carry the additional burden of paying attorney fees from the benefits claimant 
receives. 
Counsel is not entitled to the 10% of the benefits he holds in trust from the prior benefits 
Claimant has received. Further, Counsel is not entitled to $17,612.44 of the attorney fees he took 
from the checks received following the September 2009 order. $17,612.44 is the difference 
between the attorney fees taken and the attorney fees paid by Defendants per the stipulation 
($76,320.56 - $58,708.13). Of the money Counsel holds in trust, $17,612.43 will be retu .. 111ed to 
Claimant. 
Fees on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
Attorney fees from the proceeds of lump sum settlement agreements are provided for 
through Idaho Code § 72-803 and IDAPA 17.02.08.033. Under Idaho Code § 72-803, the 
Industrial Commission is empowered to approve all claims for attorney's fees. Pursuant to its 
rule making authority under Idaho Code § 72-508, the Commission has adopted a set of criteria 
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for the approval of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases. See, IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
Under these rules, a claimant's attorney is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees which are 
consistent with the fee agreement, and are to be satisfied from "available funds". Available 
funds are defined as a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the 
attorney. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. Under section 01.C, a "charging lien" may be asserted by 
an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; 
11. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the funds 
out of which the attorney seeks to be paid; 
m. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather 
than from the client; 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case 
through which the fund was raised; and, 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application 
of the charging lien". 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. 
Further, the rules in a case in which no hearing has been held, 25% of available funds is 
presumed reasonable and in a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted 30% of 
available funds shall be presumed reasonable. IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.e. 
While, as Counsel argues, the IDAP A does not have a specific fee percentage set for 
situations of cases that go to re hearing or on appeal, it is able handle those situations within the 
current framework. It cannot be said. that no guidelines are in place for this case. The properly 
enacted regulatory scheme applies to this case just as it does to all cases settled by way of lump 
sum settlement agreement. There is no practical way to create a rule that fits every foreseeable 
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situation. Instead the current rules give the Commission authority to evaluate the individual case 
and determine entitlement to attorney fees. 
In support of his argument for attorney fees on the lump sum settlement Counsel sets 
forth the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which he maintained 
through the years of litigation at the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant 
testified that it was Counsel who pushed her along and had faith, even after unfavorable 
decisions, that the claim was valid and worth pursuing. Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond 
the ordinary case and the Commission findsthat such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond 
the ordinary. 
The Commission finds Counsel responsible for obtaining the lump sum settlement and 
further, that his efforts warrant an attorney in the amount of 40% of the proceeds of the lump 
sum settlement agreement. Thus, Mr. Berry is entitled to attorney fees in the amount of 40% of 
$248,750.00. Counsel has already received 30% leaving 10% ($24,875.00) to be disbursed to 
Counsel as the remainder owed. 
Attorney Fees on the May 18, 2006 Benefit Payment 
Counsel further requests attorney fees from the $15,630.73 benefit check issued on May 
18, 2006. Counser states that in an oversight he did not deduct fees from that check. The 
Commission will approve Counsel's request for 30% of $15,630.73 in attorney fees, equaling 
$4,689.22. 
Amount Remaining in Trust 
By the Commission's calculations, $4,376.10 remains in Counsel's trust account after the 
above deductions have been made ($51,552.76 - $17,612.43 - $24,875.00 - $4,689.22 = 
$4,376.11). This amount has been held in trust but Counsel has not proven that he is entitled to 
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further attorney fees. Thus, the remaining $4,376.11 is payable to Claimant. 
Conclusion 
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that of the $51,552.76 
remaining in Counsel's trust account, Counsel is entitled to attorney fees of $24,875.00 and 
$4,689.22 and Claimant is entitled to $17,612.43 and $4,376.11. Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Mr. Berry is entitled to additional attorney fees of $29,564.22. 
Claimant is entitled to $21,988.54. 
DATEDthis J/irdayof ~~ , 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Recused 
_Thomas P. Baskin,-Commissioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
!hereby certify that on the-;J/sr day of~ , 2012 a true and correct copy of 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES.was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the 
following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
POBOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
MARK PETERSON 
POBOX829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
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Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney Fees 
(November 19, 2012) 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VERDENE PAGE, 
Claimant, 
v. 
McCAIN FOODS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2002-007246 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
FI LED 
NOV 1 9 2012 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This matter comes before the Commission on Claimant's motion for reconsideration of 
Commission's June 21, 2012 Order on Attorney Fees. The Order on Attorney Fees found that 
. Claimant's counsel (Counsel) was not entitled to additional attorney fees from Claimant after 
Counsel entered into a stipulation with Defendants allowing 30% in attorney fees. The 
Commission further stated that attorney fees awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804 constitute 
the fees that Counsel is to accept and are not to be added into the pot of all other benefits before 
the contingent fee is taken. 
Under Idaho Code§ 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of :fraud, shall 
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the 
date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision .. 
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. and in any such event the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or 
reconsideration or the filing of th~ decision on rehearing or reconsideration. J.R.P. 3(±) states· 
that a motion to reconsider "shall be supported by a brief filed with the motion. 11 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and 
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is 
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during a reconsideration. Davison v. 
HH Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision 
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question,' based on the 
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame 
established in Idaho Code§ 72~718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 
P.3d 329 (2000) (citing.Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 
(1988)). 
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual 
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. However, the 
Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply 
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor. 
Counsel argues that he should be entitled to attorney fees from Defendants 'pursuant to · 
Idaho Code §72-804 (30% of benefits received per the stipulation executed by Counsel and 
Defendants), as well as additional attorney fees from Claimant. Counsel states that it is obvious 
that without the stipulation he would have been awarded 40% of fees. The Commission does not 
agree that such a conclusion is obvious. The issue would have been addressed by both parties 
and arguments would have been made before the Commission would have ruled on what was 
appropriate for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. As stated before 
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Counsel had the opportunity to request 40% from Defendants and come to the Commission for a 
ruling on that issue. The difference comes in how Counsel seeks his attorney fees and who will 
bear the responsibility to pay those fees. The additional fees that Counsel is requesting will 
come directly from Claimant, as opposed to Counsel making a case for 40% attorney fees to be 
paid by Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. 
Counsel avers that because of the efforts in arguing for attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§72-804, he is entitled to combine the amount of attorney fees awarded with the other 
compensation and then take his percentage of the entire pot. Counsel argues that the 804 
attorney fee represents a benefit which should be treated like all other benefits and should be 
included in the total amount of benefits from which contingent fees are due. Counsel contends 
that it is unrealistic for the Commission to think that any attorney would pursue an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 if they will simply receive the same recovery as 
they would receive. 
The Commission acknowledges that Counsel will receive a larger fee if the percentage is 
taken from the full pot, but it does not necessary follow that all claimant attorneys will walk 
away from seeking 804 attorney fees if that calculation is not done. The Commission has great 
faith that the majority of attorneys representing claimants seek to assist the claimant in keeping 
the entirety of his or her benefits as well as to make defendants responsible for their 
unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. Additionally, if Counsel's position is adopted how are 
the responsibilities to be split?· In this case Defendants paid 30% and Counsel is asking Claimant 
to pay another 10%. But if Counsel had only asked Defendants for 20%, would Counsel ask 
Claimant for another 20%. The Commission appreciates that Counsel is concerned with the 
general process of compensating and incentivizing claimant attorneys, but the system must also 
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keep mind the interests of claimants and the recovery of their benefits. 
The Commission notes that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 does not apply to awards of attorney 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 governs lump sum settlements 
but awards of attorney fees under Idaho Code §72-804 are guided by the analysis set forth in: 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). 
The Commission has reviewed the Order on Attorney Fees as well as the supporting 
documents and we still find that the facts support the order. Although Claimant disagrees with 
the Commission's conclusions, the Commission finds the order is supported by .substantial 
evidence in the file and Claimant has presented no persuasive argument to disturb the order. 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
\ wqtur1 A 1 J DATED this _L.:_ day of f\ltrfl(J1 re( , 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Recused· 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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